Where the Battle of Algiers rages on ...Rick's Cafe Americain

The Rams had fallen behind 23-12 late in the game with just enough time for the Rams to drive quickly for a score, stop Carolina, get the ball back and score again.  Showing questionable use of time management (not much sense of urgency, some questionable run calls that ate precious time, and eating 2 of 3 timeouts) the Rams scored a touchdown with 2:44 remaining and got the two-point conversion to climb within three points.  With only one timeout, the Rams all but had to go for the onsides kick, which they managed to recover with 2:38 remaining.  On first down, the Rams completed a twenty-yard pass (in bounds) to reach the Carolina 38 and let the clock run down to the 2 minute warning.  So far, so good.  Next play, the Rams complete a 13-yard pass (in bounds) and let the clock run down to 1:24 before snapping the next play.  It is arguably questionable to let that much time run off, but, then again, there are two competing clock management concerns in this situation.  On the one hand, the Rams want to make sure they don’t run out of time.  On the other hand, if the Rams score too quickly they give Carolina’s offense a chance to come back.  The goal, of course, should be to score a TD to take the lead with as little time remaining as possible, but, in attempting to do this, not jeopardize the field goal to tie the game.  Consequently, somewhat conservative play is warranted; i.e., no forced passes, throw out of bounds to avoid sacks if first option is not there, etc.  It was at this point that Mike Martz (who, ironically is often criticized for being too aggressive) lost his mind.

On the next play, the Rams completed a six-yard pass down to the 19.  Somewhat surprisingly, the Rams show no sense of urgency and they don’t snap the next play until only :42 remains.  However, there is still plenty of time to get a first down and then take some shots at the end zone, so the play calling is still viable, if a little questionable.  But on second down, the Rams ran Marshall Faulk for 4 yards and the first down and then Mike Martz decides to run the clock down to kick the field goal to send the game into overtime. This was an unbelievably stupid decision.  Martz took away a chance to win the game outright in order to avoid the more minimal risk that the Rams would lose their chance at a game tying field goal.  This is a mathematically insane decision and has no tactical purpose.

The odds of making the 32-yard field goal are probably 90-95% (Jeff Wilkins was 27/29 inside of 39 yards on the season).  The odds of winning in overtime are essentially 50/50, but if we give the Rams the benefit of the doubt (at home, have momentum, more high powered offense and perhaps the slightly better kicker) we could up those odds to 55-60% (but either way, whichever team wins the 50/50 coin toss would be favored, something Martz has no control over).  On the other hand, what are the odds of the Rams scoring a touchdown with a 2nd down from the 19 with 1:24 to work with and one time out (let alone from the 25 with first down and 2:00 minutes remaining)?  Or from the 15 yard line with :42 seconds remaining and first down (three shots into the end zone)?  In 2002, all teams converted for touchdowns inside the red zone 53% of the time.  I am guessing that the high-powered 2003 Rams offense had a higher percentage than that (though I could not find any 2003 stats online).  Of course, this percentage must be lowered to account for the fact that the Rams’ options would be somewhat limited because of time (though if they had managed for this from the 2-minute warning on this would have been much less of an issue) and because they would, of course, play more conservative than normal in terms of turnovers and sacks.  Conversely, however, the Rams were clicking on all cylinders and the Panthers defense had to be exhausted after having to defend two straight possessions, which would click the percentages back up.  And, I am not even taking into account, at least not mathematically, the possibility that showing no faith in your quarterback/offense to try and win the game might actually decrease the Rams chances in OT. But let’s be ultra conservative and say that the Rams had a 20% chance of scoring a touchdown (which would essentially end the game, but for the statistically insignificant chance that Carolina could drive the field and score with very little time left). 

So what are the risks?  A turnover would end the game.  A sack or a penalty would lower the field goal percentages (though Wilken’s percentage up to 50 yards is still 90%+, so they would have to lose a lot of yards for that to make that much of a difference) but there would still be opportunities to get more yards in the case of a penalty.  So what are the odds?  In 2002 all NFL teams committed turnovers in the red zone 6% of the time (with the highest team turning it over 15% of the time, the Rams turned it over 13% of the time in 2002 inside the red zone, but they were 7-9 in 2002, compared to 12-4 this year).  Of course, Martz should tell the quarterback to not take any chances with the passes and to throw the ball away if the first option is not there in order to lower the risk of a sack.  Additionally, the Rams would only be running a few plays, which further lowers the risk of a turnover.  But let’s be overly risk adverse and say that there is a 10% chance of a turnover or a negative play that significantly diminishes the chance of a field goal being made.

If we give the Rams a 95% of making the field goal and a 55% chance of winning an overtime game and 20% chance of winning before OT if they go for a touchdown, compared to a 10% chance of losing without getting a chance to kick, the Rams chances of winning the game are 52% if they follow Martz’s strategy and 57% if they attempt to score the touchdown.  That may not sound like much, but it is an undeniable difference and considering how many football games turn on a single play or call, any coach would kill for a 5% increase in their odds of winning (and you might want to ask the Vikings or Dolphins if they find the 6% difference in winning percentage that kept them out of the playoffs to be significant – or better yet, ask a bookie what a 5% margin means to them).  Further, if we change the percentages to something that is probably more accurate (95% chance of making the field goal, 52% chance of winning in OT, 30% of scoring the TD and 5% chance of a turnover or a devastating sack or penalty) the ratios change to 49% following Martz’s strategy and 62% trying for the touchdown and that is a huge difference – to put it differently, the Rams are more than 25% more likely to win by trying for the touchdown (for the mathematically challenged, that is the percentage differential between 49 and 62%).  Or, to put it more clearly, Martz is an IDIOT!

So, the Rams kick the field goal and, as the Tuesday Morning Quarterback would say, the football gods made their displeasure known as Carolina, naturally, won in OT. 

The OT was crazy, and quite entertaining, as both teams missed field goals and presented another, though more debatable, example of risk adverse coaching.  Carolina took the opening kickoff and promptly drove down to the Rams’ 21.  On first down, rather than trying to get more yards, the Panthers ran a QB sneak to center the field goal and lost one yard.  Carolina lined up for the field goal and kicked it through the uprights, but they let the play clock expire (which is itself inexcusable as they had THREE TIMEOUTS to use) and lost five yards.  Changing their minds, Carolina then tried two very conservative run plays, lost one more yard and then lined up for the 40+ yard field goal and missed it, barely.

This style of coaching is much more debatable.  Most NFL kickers are 90%+ inside of 40 yards and defenses have every incentive, once the offense is in field goal range, to gamble and try to force a turnover or a sack.  I don’t have any problem with playing for a field goal instead of going for a touchdown in such a situation, but I personally would not turn off the offense until I was at least inside the 15 and, if there was a large enough statistical sample, I bet I would be proven correct (especially in a situation where the game is tied such that a turnover does not mean an automatic loss).

But either way, Carolina’s tactics are much more defensible.  Martz, however, is simply an idiot and there is no excuse for his end of regulation decision.  While in football, like poker, one cannot always run the “percentage” play because if the other team expects it, the percentage play may not actually be the percentage play.  So sometimes you roll the dice, like on 4th and 1 down three with less than 2 minutes to go, instead of running up the middle as everyone expects, you play action pass, throw deep, hit the WR for the game winning TD and Holy Buckeye! continue on your season of destiny.  But there was no tactical misdirection in Martz’s decision, it was a question of pure mathematical likelihood and he failed miserably.  And, for the record, if the Rams had scored that touchdown, I would have won my bet on the game.  Thanks Mike. 

The Rams had fallen behind 23-12 late in the game with just enough time for the Rams to drive quickly for a score, stop Carolina, get the ball back and score again.  Showing questionable use of time management (not much sense of urgency, some questionable run calls that ate precious time, and eating 2 of 3 timeouts) the Rams scored a touchdown with 2:44 remaining and got the two-point conversion to climb within three points.  With only one timeout, the Rams all but had to go for the onsides kick, which they managed to recover with 2:38 remaining.  On first down, the Rams completed a twenty-yard pass (in bounds) to reach the Carolina 38 and let the clock run down to the 2 minute warning.  So far, so good.  Next play, the Rams complete a 13-yard pass (in bounds) and let the clock run down to 1:24 before snapping the next play.  It is arguably questionable to let that much time run off, but, then again, there are two competing clock management concerns in this situation.  On the one hand, the Rams want to make sure they don’t run out of time.  On the other hand, if the Rams score too quickly they give Carolina’s offense a chance to come back.  The goal, of course, should be to score a TD to take the lead with as little time remaining as possible, but, in attempting to do this, not jeopardize the field goal to tie the game.  Consequently, somewhat conservative play is warranted; i.e., no forced passes, throw out of bounds to avoid sacks if first option is not there, etc.  It was at this point that Mike Martz (who, ironically is often criticized for being too aggressive) lost his mind.

On the next play, the Rams completed a six-yard pass down to the 19.  Somewhat surprisingly, the Rams show no sense of urgency and they don’t snap the next play until only :42 remains.  However, there is still plenty of time to get a first down and then take some shots at the end zone, so the play calling is still viable, if a little questionable.  But on second down, the Rams ran Marshall Faulk for 4 yards and the first down and then Mike Martz decides to run the clock down to kick the field goal to send the game into overtime. This was an unbelievably stupid decision.  Martz took away a chance to win the game outright in order to avoid the more minimal risk that the Rams would lose their chance at a game tying field goal.  This is a mathematically insane decision and has no tactical purpose.

The odds of making the 32-yard field goal are probably 90-95% (Jeff Wilkins was 27/29 inside of 39 yards on the season).  The odds of winning in overtime are essentially 50/50, but if we give the Rams the benefit of the doubt (at home, have momentum, more high powered offense and perhaps the slightly better kicker) we could up those odds to 55-60% (but either way, whichever team wins the 50/50 coin toss would be favored, something Martz has no control over).  On the other hand, what are the odds of the Rams scoring a touchdown with a 2nd down from the 19 with 1:24 to work with and one time out (let alone from the 25 with first down and 2:00 minutes remaining)?  Or from the 15 yard line with :42 seconds remaining and first down (three shots into the end zone)?  In 2002, all teams converted for touchdowns inside the red zone 53% of the time.  I am guessing that the high-powered 2003 Rams offense had a higher percentage than that (though I could not find any 2003 stats online).  Of course, this percentage must be lowered to account for the fact that the Rams’ options would be somewhat limited because of time (though if they had managed for this from the 2-minute warning on this would have been much less of an issue) and because they would, of course, play more conservative than normal in terms of turnovers and sacks.  Conversely, however, the Rams were clicking on all cylinders and the Panthers defense had to be exhausted after having to defend two straight possessions, which would click the percentages back up.  And, I am not even taking into account, at least not mathematically, the possibility that showing no faith in your quarterback/offense to try and win the game might actually decrease the Rams chances in OT. But let’s be ultra conservative and say that the Rams had a 20% chance of scoring a touchdown (which would essentially end the game, but for the statistically insignificant chance that Carolina could drive the field and score with very little time left). 

So what are the risks?  A turnover would end the game.  A sack or a penalty would lower the field goal percentages (though Wilken’s percentage up to 50 yards is still 90%+, so they would have to lose a lot of yards for that to make that much of a difference) but there would still be opportunities to get more yards in the case of a penalty.  So what are the odds?  In 2002 all NFL teams committed turnovers in the red zone 6% of the time (with the highest team turning it over 15% of the time, the Rams turned it over 13% of the time in 2002 inside the red zone, but they were 7-9 in 2002, compared to 12-4 this year).  Of course, Martz should tell the quarterback to not take any chances with the passes and to throw the ball away if the first option is not there in order to lower the risk of a sack.  Additionally, the Rams would only be running a few plays, which further lowers the risk of a turnover.  But let’s be overly risk adverse and say that there is a 10% chance of a turnover or a negative play that significantly diminishes the chance of a field goal being made.

If we give the Rams a 95% of making the field goal and a 55% chance of winning an overtime game and 20% chance of winning before OT if they go for a touchdown, compared to a 10% chance of losing without getting a chance to kick, the Rams chances of winning the game are 52% if they follow Martz’s strategy and 57% if they attempt to score the touchdown.  That may not sound like much, but it is an undeniable difference and considering how many football games turn on a single play or call, any coach would kill for a 5% increase in their odds of winning (and you might want to ask the Vikings or Dolphins if they find the 6% difference in winning percentage that kept them out of the playoffs to be significant – or better yet, ask a bookie what a 5% margin means to them).  Further, if we change the percentages to something that is probably more accurate (95% chance of making the field goal, 52% chance of winning in OT, 30% of scoring the TD and 5% chance of a turnover or a devastating sack or penalty) the ratios change to 49% following Martz’s strategy and 62% trying for the touchdown and that is a huge difference – to put it differently, the Rams are more than 25% more likely to win by trying for the touchdown (for the mathematically challenged, that is the percentage differential between 49 and 62%).  Or, to put it more clearly, Martz is an IDIOT!

So, the Rams kick the field goal and, as the Tuesday Morning Quarterback would say, the football gods made their displeasure known as Carolina, naturally, won in OT. 

The OT was crazy, and quite entertaining, as both teams missed field goals and presented another, though more debatable, example of risk adverse coaching.  Carolina took the opening kickoff and promptly drove down to the Rams’ 21.  On first down, rather than trying to get more yards, the Panthers ran a QB sneak to center the field goal and lost one yard.  Carolina lined up for the field goal and kicked it through the uprights, but they let the play clock expire (which is itself inexcusable as they had THREE TIMEOUTS to use) and lost five yards.  Changing their minds, Carolina then tried two very conservative run plays, lost one more yard and then lined up for the 40+ yard field goal and missed it, barely.

This style of coaching is much more debatable.  Most NFL kickers are 90%+ inside of 40 yards and defenses have every incentive, once the offense is in field goal range, to gamble and try to force a turnover or a sack.  I don’t have any problem with playing for a field goal instead of going for a touchdown in such a situation, but I personally would not turn off the offense until I was at least inside the 15 and, if there was a large enough statistical sample, I bet I would be proven correct (especially in a situation where the game is tied such that a turnover does not mean an automatic loss).

But either way, Carolina’s tactics are much more defensible.  Martz, however, is simply an idiot and there is no excuse for his end of regulation decision.  While in football, like poker, one cannot always run the “percentage” play because if the other team expects it, the percentage play may not actually be the percentage play.  So sometimes you roll the dice, like on 4th and 1 down three with less than 2 minutes to go, instead of running up the middle as everyone expects, you play action pass, throw deep, hit the WR for the game winning TD and Holy Buckeye! continue on your season of destiny.  But there was no tactical misdirection in Martz’s decision, it was a question of pure mathematical likelihood and he failed miserably.  And, for the record, if the Rams had scored that touchdown, I would have won my bet on the game.  Thanks Mike.