Where Sam doesn't play anymore ...Rick's Cafe Americain

My rooting interests have always been strange.  As I kid growing up in Queens I picked the teams that I would follow for the rest of my life for strange reasons.  I chose the New Orleans Saints and the Detroit Red Wings for their symbols (the fleur-de-lis and winged wheel, respectively). I chose the Lakers because of an airlines commercial starting Wilt Chamberlain and Kareem Abdul-Jabbar that is lost to the ages.  And I chose the Pirates because a young benchwarming Ugarte was on a little league team called the Pirates that went undefeated in 1978.  The next year Willie Stargell and Sister Sledge took the Lumber Company to the World Series, cementing my devotion to the Pirates and weaning me from the Yankees.  (I confess to still bandwagonning the Yankees so that I can care about baseball in October.  And my first pro game actually included someone telling me “They aren’t booing, they are saying “Looooooou!,” so I have a deep affection for the Yanks.)

The Pirates used to play in the NL East along with the Mets, so I could always see them at least a few times a year.  I saw the 18-inning marathon that included an old Rusty Staub saving the game for the Mets despite being swapped between right and left field with Clint Hurdle on virtually every batter to keep him as far away from the action as possible.  I got on camera during the Banner Day festivities (yes, I taped it; no, I didn’t save the tape) between the games of a Mets-Pirates doubleheader in 1987 with my friend Chris (a Yankee fan wearing a Yankee hat) while holding a spray-painted cardboard box that said “Pirates Rule!” when the intricately illustrated bedsheet of a Mets flotilla sinking a pirate ship was caught in the wind just as the camera trained on it when WOR was going to commercial.  I saw the great Pirates teams of the early 90’s before the team ran out of money and dove into the cellar.

With realignment, the Pirates moved from the NL East to the NL Central.  Then MLB “unbalanced” the schedule so that teams play more games against their division rivals. Now the Pirates play at Shea for only one series a year.  That series is this weekend, so you will see me there rooting on a team of youngsters (Kip Wells, Josh Fogg, Oliver Perez, Bobby Hill, Craig Wilson) and overpaid mediocrity (Raul Mondesi, Randall Simon). With pride.

Tonight, the future of pitching (Kip Wells) faces its past (Tom Glavine).  Saturday afternoon, its more of the same as Oliver Perez meets Steve Trachsel.  The series wraps up with the unrealized potential of Kris Benson meeting the pitcher Art Howe tried to send to AAA, Jae Weong Seo.  Yes, that is exactly as well as I can sell the Sunday matchup.

Except maybe like this: Doesn’t it seem like perfect weather for an April game?

See you at the ballpark Saturday and Sunday.

#2 N.J. vs. #7 Cleveland: After a post All-Star break surge, the Cavs have fallen back, now 2 games out of the playoffs.  But LeBron NEEDS to be in the playoffs for Stern and for NIKE, so look for the stars to align (and for them to pick up the extra ½ game on the Knicks so we can see Reggie at the Garden).  Shit, LeBron and Co. might even beat the slumping Nets.

#1 Sacramento vs. #8 Denver:  It is a three team race for the final playoff spot out West and the Jazz (who seem immune to all “outside” influences) somehow occupy the last spot with a bunch of nobodies.  But Melo also needs to go to the playoffs, so look for the Nuggets to back door in.  While the Lakers are surging and closing fast on Sacramento, now that CWeb is ruining the Kings chemistry, look for Sacramento to hold on to the #1 seed, so the NBA can at least pretend that someone might be able to stop L.A. from romping to another title.

No conspiracy stories to tell in the rest of the seedings. 

#2 N.J. vs. #7 Cleveland: After a post All-Star break surge, the Cavs have fallen back, now 2 games out of the playoffs.  But LeBron NEEDS to be in the playoffs for Stern and for NIKE, so look for the stars to align (and for them to pick up the extra ½ game on the Knicks so we can see Reggie at the Garden).  Shit, LeBron and Co. might even beat the slumping Nets.

#1 Sacramento vs. #8 Denver:  It is a three team race for the final playoff spot out West and the Jazz (who seem immune to all “outside” influences) somehow occupy the last spot with a bunch of nobodies.  But Melo also needs to go to the playoffs, so look for the Nuggets to back door in.  While the Lakers are surging and closing fast on Sacramento, now that CWeb is ruining the Kings chemistry, look for Sacramento to hold on to the #1 seed, so the NBA can at least pretend that someone might be able to stop L.A. from romping to another title.

No conspiracy stories to tell in the rest of the seedings. 

This trade was years in the making, the result of a mindset among the owners that the cost of players is far too high.  Somehow the Rodriguez contract, by virtue of being the biggest, became the symbol of everything that is wrong with baseball salaries.  This always seemed strange to me.  He was the highest paid player because he was the best, most consistent player year in and year out not named Barry Bonds, with the added value of not being in his late 30’s.  Rangers owner Tom Hicks then managed to make everyone believe that the ARod contract is what kept the Rangers mired in last place. (Well, not everyone, as this pissing contest between me and The Fat Guy will attest.) The ARod contract was never the Rangers’ problem and trading it away actually solves nothing.  It does, however, add ammunition to the argument that baseball needs to revamp its financial structure and increase revenue sharing.  Essentially, it is part of an attempt to have the league force the Yankees to cough up more money.

I don’t mean for this rant to sound like a conspiracy theory, because I don’t think that there is an actual conspiracy.  On the other hand, the non-Steinbrenner owners are essentially of a common mind: the Yankees are evil and must be stopped. Their fears aren’t completely unfounded.  Because the Yankees play in a colossal media market, the team has scads of extra cash - and they spend it in abundance.  On the other hand, the payroll difference between the Yankees and teams like the Rangers, Dodgers, Orioles and Mets isn’t so vast.  All those teams have money to burn but no wins to show for it because they spend their money stupidly; the Yankees ROI is pretty impressive by comparison.  Not wanting to look inward, these teams instead see New York as the problem.

And so back to the not-conspiracy.  How do you “prove” without contradiction the Yankees-are-evil argument?  Send the most expensive player in the league to New York.  Of course it doesn’t really come out that way.  The Rangers assumed so much of ARod’s contract that he is only the third highest paid player in New York. (Yes, I understand the significance of that.) And a substantial part of his contract is paid for by Aaron Boone’s bad luck and by the “retirement” of Drew Henson.  How could the Yankees not make this trade? 

On the other hand, the Rangers aren’t getting nearly enough back. Alfonso Soriano is a great young player.  He will make less than $6MM in 2004, which is an astounding bargain for a player that good.  Of course he never walks, and that free-swinging style sure seemed to catch up with him in the playoffs. (Small sample size, of course, but he looked really bad.) Still, he sure isn’t as good as Rodriguez.  I don’t know who the player to be named later is going to be, but I don’t think the Yankees have anyone (that they would actually trade) good enough to fill the gap.  Since the Rangers aren’t getting back fair value in talent (and Soriano is going to keep getting more expensive), there has to be another reason.  There are reasons, but they aren’t good ones.

The first reason is payroll flexibility.  We may have to wait a couple of years to check this, but here is the prediction: the Rangers will squander (or merely pocket) the savings from dealing ARod and the team will not significantly improve. The second reason is CYA.  Hicks needed a scapegoat for the Rangers failure and he decided to make it the ARod contract.  This move should buy him a little time to turn the franchise around. Or to think of another excuse why he hasn’t.  It also has the virtue of making Hicks a sympathetic character.  A guy who got in too deep, and couldn’t escape his one mistake ...  The third reason is to use the trade as a demonstration of the need for change in baseball.

The trade makes the Yankees a bonus scapegoat.  The team that can buy everything bought the crown jewel of the Rangers also. Don’t buy this line of bull.  Before comparing the Rangers to the Yankees, remember the success of the Twins, Marlins and A’s - all operating on shoestring budgets. 

I understand the problems of small market teams.  While I am sort of a Yankee fan, I live and die with the Pittsburgh Pirates. Mostly die. The Pirates wish that they had the Rangers’ problems.  ARod wasn’t the problem in Texas and neither were the Yankees.  But after this stupid deal, the Yankees and ARod will be a significant problem to the Rangers for the forseeable future. 

This just in: The Dodgers got on the clue train before the Rangers did. The Dodgers are about to join the Yankees and Red Sox as rich teams who know what to do with the money at their disposal.  The Dodgers just hired Paul DePodesta away from the A’s. DePodesta and Billy Beane in Oakland were like Charlie Munger and Warren Buffett at Berkshire Hathaway.  The National League had better hope that Beane and DePodesta are worth far less apart than they are together. Don’t count on it; expect a World Series appearance in LA by 2006.

The Rams had fallen behind 23-12 late in the game with just enough time for the Rams to drive quickly for a score, stop Carolina, get the ball back and score again.  Showing questionable use of time management (not much sense of urgency, some questionable run calls that ate precious time, and eating 2 of 3 timeouts) the Rams scored a touchdown with 2:44 remaining and got the two-point conversion to climb within three points.  With only one timeout, the Rams all but had to go for the onsides kick, which they managed to recover with 2:38 remaining.  On first down, the Rams completed a twenty-yard pass (in bounds) to reach the Carolina 38 and let the clock run down to the 2 minute warning.  So far, so good.  Next play, the Rams complete a 13-yard pass (in bounds) and let the clock run down to 1:24 before snapping the next play.  It is arguably questionable to let that much time run off, but, then again, there are two competing clock management concerns in this situation.  On the one hand, the Rams want to make sure they don’t run out of time.  On the other hand, if the Rams score too quickly they give Carolina’s offense a chance to come back.  The goal, of course, should be to score a TD to take the lead with as little time remaining as possible, but, in attempting to do this, not jeopardize the field goal to tie the game.  Consequently, somewhat conservative play is warranted; i.e., no forced passes, throw out of bounds to avoid sacks if first option is not there, etc.  It was at this point that Mike Martz (who, ironically is often criticized for being too aggressive) lost his mind.

On the next play, the Rams completed a six-yard pass down to the 19.  Somewhat surprisingly, the Rams show no sense of urgency and they don’t snap the next play until only :42 remains.  However, there is still plenty of time to get a first down and then take some shots at the end zone, so the play calling is still viable, if a little questionable.  But on second down, the Rams ran Marshall Faulk for 4 yards and the first down and then Mike Martz decides to run the clock down to kick the field goal to send the game into overtime. This was an unbelievably stupid decision.  Martz took away a chance to win the game outright in order to avoid the more minimal risk that the Rams would lose their chance at a game tying field goal.  This is a mathematically insane decision and has no tactical purpose.

The odds of making the 32-yard field goal are probably 90-95% (Jeff Wilkins was 27/29 inside of 39 yards on the season).  The odds of winning in overtime are essentially 50/50, but if we give the Rams the benefit of the doubt (at home, have momentum, more high powered offense and perhaps the slightly better kicker) we could up those odds to 55-60% (but either way, whichever team wins the 50/50 coin toss would be favored, something Martz has no control over).  On the other hand, what are the odds of the Rams scoring a touchdown with a 2nd down from the 19 with 1:24 to work with and one time out (let alone from the 25 with first down and 2:00 minutes remaining)?  Or from the 15 yard line with :42 seconds remaining and first down (three shots into the end zone)?  In 2002, all teams converted for touchdowns inside the red zone 53% of the time.  I am guessing that the high-powered 2003 Rams offense had a higher percentage than that (though I could not find any 2003 stats online).  Of course, this percentage must be lowered to account for the fact that the Rams’ options would be somewhat limited because of time (though if they had managed for this from the 2-minute warning on this would have been much less of an issue) and because they would, of course, play more conservative than normal in terms of turnovers and sacks.  Conversely, however, the Rams were clicking on all cylinders and the Panthers defense had to be exhausted after having to defend two straight possessions, which would click the percentages back up.  And, I am not even taking into account, at least not mathematically, the possibility that showing no faith in your quarterback/offense to try and win the game might actually decrease the Rams chances in OT. But let’s be ultra conservative and say that the Rams had a 20% chance of scoring a touchdown (which would essentially end the game, but for the statistically insignificant chance that Carolina could drive the field and score with very little time left). 

So what are the risks?  A turnover would end the game.  A sack or a penalty would lower the field goal percentages (though Wilken’s percentage up to 50 yards is still 90%+, so they would have to lose a lot of yards for that to make that much of a difference) but there would still be opportunities to get more yards in the case of a penalty.  So what are the odds?  In 2002 all NFL teams committed turnovers in the red zone 6% of the time (with the highest team turning it over 15% of the time, the Rams turned it over 13% of the time in 2002 inside the red zone, but they were 7-9 in 2002, compared to 12-4 this year).  Of course, Martz should tell the quarterback to not take any chances with the passes and to throw the ball away if the first option is not there in order to lower the risk of a sack.  Additionally, the Rams would only be running a few plays, which further lowers the risk of a turnover.  But let’s be overly risk adverse and say that there is a 10% chance of a turnover or a negative play that significantly diminishes the chance of a field goal being made.

If we give the Rams a 95% of making the field goal and a 55% chance of winning an overtime game and 20% chance of winning before OT if they go for a touchdown, compared to a 10% chance of losing without getting a chance to kick, the Rams chances of winning the game are 52% if they follow Martz’s strategy and 57% if they attempt to score the touchdown.  That may not sound like much, but it is an undeniable difference and considering how many football games turn on a single play or call, any coach would kill for a 5% increase in their odds of winning (and you might want to ask the Vikings or Dolphins if they find the 6% difference in winning percentage that kept them out of the playoffs to be significant – or better yet, ask a bookie what a 5% margin means to them).  Further, if we change the percentages to something that is probably more accurate (95% chance of making the field goal, 52% chance of winning in OT, 30% of scoring the TD and 5% chance of a turnover or a devastating sack or penalty) the ratios change to 49% following Martz’s strategy and 62% trying for the touchdown and that is a huge difference – to put it differently, the Rams are more than 25% more likely to win by trying for the touchdown (for the mathematically challenged, that is the percentage differential between 49 and 62%).  Or, to put it more clearly, Martz is an IDIOT!

So, the Rams kick the field goal and, as the Tuesday Morning Quarterback would say, the football gods made their displeasure known as Carolina, naturally, won in OT. 

The OT was crazy, and quite entertaining, as both teams missed field goals and presented another, though more debatable, example of risk adverse coaching.  Carolina took the opening kickoff and promptly drove down to the Rams’ 21.  On first down, rather than trying to get more yards, the Panthers ran a QB sneak to center the field goal and lost one yard.  Carolina lined up for the field goal and kicked it through the uprights, but they let the play clock expire (which is itself inexcusable as they had THREE TIMEOUTS to use) and lost five yards.  Changing their minds, Carolina then tried two very conservative run plays, lost one more yard and then lined up for the 40+ yard field goal and missed it, barely.

This style of coaching is much more debatable.  Most NFL kickers are 90%+ inside of 40 yards and defenses have every incentive, once the offense is in field goal range, to gamble and try to force a turnover or a sack.  I don’t have any problem with playing for a field goal instead of going for a touchdown in such a situation, but I personally would not turn off the offense until I was at least inside the 15 and, if there was a large enough statistical sample, I bet I would be proven correct (especially in a situation where the game is tied such that a turnover does not mean an automatic loss).

But either way, Carolina’s tactics are much more defensible.  Martz, however, is simply an idiot and there is no excuse for his end of regulation decision.  While in football, like poker, one cannot always run the “percentage” play because if the other team expects it, the percentage play may not actually be the percentage play.  So sometimes you roll the dice, like on 4th and 1 down three with less than 2 minutes to go, instead of running up the middle as everyone expects, you play action pass, throw deep, hit the WR for the game winning TD and Holy Buckeye! continue on your season of destiny.  But there was no tactical misdirection in Martz’s decision, it was a question of pure mathematical likelihood and he failed miserably.  And, for the record, if the Rams had scored that touchdown, I would have won my bet on the game.  Thanks Mike. 

The Rams had fallen behind 23-12 late in the game with just enough time for the Rams to drive quickly for a score, stop Carolina, get the ball back and score again.  Showing questionable use of time management (not much sense of urgency, some questionable run calls that ate precious time, and eating 2 of 3 timeouts) the Rams scored a touchdown with 2:44 remaining and got the two-point conversion to climb within three points.  With only one timeout, the Rams all but had to go for the onsides kick, which they managed to recover with 2:38 remaining.  On first down, the Rams completed a twenty-yard pass (in bounds) to reach the Carolina 38 and let the clock run down to the 2 minute warning.  So far, so good.  Next play, the Rams complete a 13-yard pass (in bounds) and let the clock run down to 1:24 before snapping the next play.  It is arguably questionable to let that much time run off, but, then again, there are two competing clock management concerns in this situation.  On the one hand, the Rams want to make sure they don’t run out of time.  On the other hand, if the Rams score too quickly they give Carolina’s offense a chance to come back.  The goal, of course, should be to score a TD to take the lead with as little time remaining as possible, but, in attempting to do this, not jeopardize the field goal to tie the game.  Consequently, somewhat conservative play is warranted; i.e., no forced passes, throw out of bounds to avoid sacks if first option is not there, etc.  It was at this point that Mike Martz (who, ironically is often criticized for being too aggressive) lost his mind.

On the next play, the Rams completed a six-yard pass down to the 19.  Somewhat surprisingly, the Rams show no sense of urgency and they don’t snap the next play until only :42 remains.  However, there is still plenty of time to get a first down and then take some shots at the end zone, so the play calling is still viable, if a little questionable.  But on second down, the Rams ran Marshall Faulk for 4 yards and the first down and then Mike Martz decides to run the clock down to kick the field goal to send the game into overtime. This was an unbelievably stupid decision.  Martz took away a chance to win the game outright in order to avoid the more minimal risk that the Rams would lose their chance at a game tying field goal.  This is a mathematically insane decision and has no tactical purpose.

The odds of making the 32-yard field goal are probably 90-95% (Jeff Wilkins was 27/29 inside of 39 yards on the season).  The odds of winning in overtime are essentially 50/50, but if we give the Rams the benefit of the doubt (at home, have momentum, more high powered offense and perhaps the slightly better kicker) we could up those odds to 55-60% (but either way, whichever team wins the 50/50 coin toss would be favored, something Martz has no control over).  On the other hand, what are the odds of the Rams scoring a touchdown with a 2nd down from the 19 with 1:24 to work with and one time out (let alone from the 25 with first down and 2:00 minutes remaining)?  Or from the 15 yard line with :42 seconds remaining and first down (three shots into the end zone)?  In 2002, all teams converted for touchdowns inside the red zone 53% of the time.  I am guessing that the high-powered 2003 Rams offense had a higher percentage than that (though I could not find any 2003 stats online).  Of course, this percentage must be lowered to account for the fact that the Rams’ options would be somewhat limited because of time (though if they had managed for this from the 2-minute warning on this would have been much less of an issue) and because they would, of course, play more conservative than normal in terms of turnovers and sacks.  Conversely, however, the Rams were clicking on all cylinders and the Panthers defense had to be exhausted after having to defend two straight possessions, which would click the percentages back up.  And, I am not even taking into account, at least not mathematically, the possibility that showing no faith in your quarterback/offense to try and win the game might actually decrease the Rams chances in OT. But let’s be ultra conservative and say that the Rams had a 20% chance of scoring a touchdown (which would essentially end the game, but for the statistically insignificant chance that Carolina could drive the field and score with very little time left). 

So what are the risks?  A turnover would end the game.  A sack or a penalty would lower the field goal percentages (though Wilken’s percentage up to 50 yards is still 90%+, so they would have to lose a lot of yards for that to make that much of a difference) but there would still be opportunities to get more yards in the case of a penalty.  So what are the odds?  In 2002 all NFL teams committed turnovers in the red zone 6% of the time (with the highest team turning it over 15% of the time, the Rams turned it over 13% of the time in 2002 inside the red zone, but they were 7-9 in 2002, compared to 12-4 this year).  Of course, Martz should tell the quarterback to not take any chances with the passes and to throw the ball away if the first option is not there in order to lower the risk of a sack.  Additionally, the Rams would only be running a few plays, which further lowers the risk of a turnover.  But let’s be overly risk adverse and say that there is a 10% chance of a turnover or a negative play that significantly diminishes the chance of a field goal being made.

If we give the Rams a 95% of making the field goal and a 55% chance of winning an overtime game and 20% chance of winning before OT if they go for a touchdown, compared to a 10% chance of losing without getting a chance to kick, the Rams chances of winning the game are 52% if they follow Martz’s strategy and 57% if they attempt to score the touchdown.  That may not sound like much, but it is an undeniable difference and considering how many football games turn on a single play or call, any coach would kill for a 5% increase in their odds of winning (and you might want to ask the Vikings or Dolphins if they find the 6% difference in winning percentage that kept them out of the playoffs to be significant – or better yet, ask a bookie what a 5% margin means to them).  Further, if we change the percentages to something that is probably more accurate (95% chance of making the field goal, 52% chance of winning in OT, 30% of scoring the TD and 5% chance of a turnover or a devastating sack or penalty) the ratios change to 49% following Martz’s strategy and 62% trying for the touchdown and that is a huge difference – to put it differently, the Rams are more than 25% more likely to win by trying for the touchdown (for the mathematically challenged, that is the percentage differential between 49 and 62%).  Or, to put it more clearly, Martz is an IDIOT!

So, the Rams kick the field goal and, as the Tuesday Morning Quarterback would say, the football gods made their displeasure known as Carolina, naturally, won in OT. 

The OT was crazy, and quite entertaining, as both teams missed field goals and presented another, though more debatable, example of risk adverse coaching.  Carolina took the opening kickoff and promptly drove down to the Rams’ 21.  On first down, rather than trying to get more yards, the Panthers ran a QB sneak to center the field goal and lost one yard.  Carolina lined up for the field goal and kicked it through the uprights, but they let the play clock expire (which is itself inexcusable as they had THREE TIMEOUTS to use) and lost five yards.  Changing their minds, Carolina then tried two very conservative run plays, lost one more yard and then lined up for the 40+ yard field goal and missed it, barely.

This style of coaching is much more debatable.  Most NFL kickers are 90%+ inside of 40 yards and defenses have every incentive, once the offense is in field goal range, to gamble and try to force a turnover or a sack.  I don’t have any problem with playing for a field goal instead of going for a touchdown in such a situation, but I personally would not turn off the offense until I was at least inside the 15 and, if there was a large enough statistical sample, I bet I would be proven correct (especially in a situation where the game is tied such that a turnover does not mean an automatic loss).

But either way, Carolina’s tactics are much more defensible.  Martz, however, is simply an idiot and there is no excuse for his end of regulation decision.  While in football, like poker, one cannot always run the “percentage” play because if the other team expects it, the percentage play may not actually be the percentage play.  So sometimes you roll the dice, like on 4th and 1 down three with less than 2 minutes to go, instead of running up the middle as everyone expects, you play action pass, throw deep, hit the WR for the game winning TD and Holy Buckeye! continue on your season of destiny.  But there was no tactical misdirection in Martz’s decision, it was a question of pure mathematical likelihood and he failed miserably.  And, for the record, if the Rams had scored that touchdown, I would have won my bet on the game.  Thanks Mike. 

Pete Rose has now admitted that he bet on the Reds.  That’s good, I guess, because people will stop questioning the obvious.  On the other hand, he isn’t contrite at all. He has given his book a self-martyring title that is particularly execrable when compared to this book. He places limits on what he will admit to: he didn’t “place bets from the clubhouse” or “use his insider knowledge about injuries to place bets” The former is irrelevant, a sop to the pretense maintained by romantics that there is something sacred about the stadium.  The latter is just laughable; beyond the insult to our collective intelligence wrapped up in the claim, are we supposed to forgive him for being a bad gambler?

Pete Rose is, in short, a prick - even people who think he should be admitted to the Hall know this.  Even his most well-known-yet-not-infamous trait—hustle—is, aside from being overrated in its own right, more pathology than virtue with Rose.  Running out a walk isn’t “hustle”; it is a symptom of a desperate need to make sure people are always looking at him. 

His actions undermine the integrity of the games on which he bet.  The games, and the knowledge that people are trying to win, are what distinguishes competition from entertainment.  Fuck with that and there can be no absolution.

Keep him out.

What is most appalling is that they get it wrong in at least four ways (let the record show that I keep retyping this number as the list grows longer).  First, they misanalyze Rodriguez’s worth.  Second, they misanalyze the effect Rodriguez’s contract has had on his current team.  Third, they misanalyze the merits of the trade.  Fourth, they misanalyze the good and bad guys as it now appears that the trade is going to fall apart.

Almost all of these errors can be found in a single article: the ESPN.com’s Writers Bloc on the trade, a roundtable discussion in which not an iota of non-cliched thought is brought to bear until the very end.  David Schoenfeld excepted, nearly everything that is wrong with sportswriting (there is no overwrought hero worship) can be found in this one column.  Reading it just gives me that Nate McCall feeling, and so holler I will.

Most of what I have to say has been said better, and with better support at Baseball Prospectus.  First, A-Rod, while overpaid, is certainly no more overpaid than half of the league is overpaid.  Yes, he signed a ten year, $252,000,000 deal, but it is worth remembering that, with the exception of the ageless Barry Bonds, he is the best player in baseball.  And Rodriguez is more than 10 years younger than Bonds, so if you are going to make a ten year investment, A-Rod is a better bet than Bonds.  This dovetails nicely into the next issue that everyone in the mainstream sports press gets wrong.  The Rangers’ problem isn’t that ARod was overpaid, even if he is.  Rodriguez performed as well as anyone expected that he would perform.  He did exactly what the Rangers expected when they signed him to the monster contract.  The problem lies with the rest of the Rangers were are not only grossly overpaid, but have not done (and will not do) anything to earn the money they have signed for. 

Third, the trade, from a purely baseball standpoint, is much better for the Red Sox than the Rangers.  ARod is younger and better than Ramirez.  He is also much better than the player he would replace at shortstop in Boston, Nomar Garciaparra.  He is a better hitter, a better fielder, younger and more durable.  Rodriguez would be an upgrade in 2004, and a far more significant improvement for 2005 and beyond.  Garciaparra is (or once was) reportedly going to be traded to the White Sox for Magglio Ordonez.  Ordonez isn’t the hitter that Ramirez is, but he is closer to Ramirez than Nomar is to ARod, two years younger than Manny, a not-horrible fielder or base runner and, unlike Manny, actually wants to play in Boston.  The deal makes sense for the Red Sox.  Nobody who isn’t responsible for paying the players’ salaries should see this deal for what it is: Boston is robbing Texas blind.

Finally, and most galling, the union is being criticized for failing to let the owners wriggle out of their contractual obligations.  ARod, because he wants to play for a winning team, was willing to give up some salary to make the deal work.  This is noble.  The Rangers and Red Sox want to use Rodriguez’s good will as a PR cudgel against the union.  This is deplorable.  Rodriguez signed his contract in good faith.  One would think that the Rangers did also.  A long time ago, baseball players got the owners to agree that all contracts are guaranteed. This is a significant improvement over the NFL, in which a four year contract is, in fact four one-year contracts in which only the signing bonus and first year (at most) are guaranteed.  Every off-season is a charade in which the owners put their collective foot on the collective throat of half the players in order to force them to take less than they signed for.  If A-Rod agrees to just give up some money, he becomes an example for the rest of the league and a standard for future behavior.  This can only hurt the players, not the owners, and there is no reason that the union should let it happen.

I would love, as a baseball fan, to see this trade go through (I would like it less as a New Yorker), but if the cost of this trade is a weaker union I thank the MLBPA for actually looking out for the non-superstars and ARod for respecting his colleagues enough that he agreed to abide by the union’s decision.

Thanks to Dave Pappas at BP for the link with all of the Rangers’ signing blunders. I’d give you a direct link, but the article is part of the Premium service.  Subscribe.  It is worth it.